PM5624: On relationships with the usurpational powers

Basic principles:
  1. Do not recognise or accept the validity of the usurpational powers
    • It is permissible to simulate acceptance or recognition when doing so benefits the Cause
  2. However, at the same time, avoid open confrontation with them before the Cause is ready

On rebel movements (non-secessionist)

Rebel movements generally represent an attempt by one group of would be usurpers to take the place of another. As such, in themselves, they are not a positive thing, they are not progressing the Cause, they do not fix the fundamental problem, which is usurpation, they just exchange one group of usurpers for another. Therefore, in general, we should not endorse or support such movements. However, if we have good reason to believe that the success of such a movement would be of benefit to the Cause (such as by increasing its liberty), then we may support it. But be wary that many movements promise change which they do not deliver; many times has a movement come promising freedom from tyranny, only to prove an even greater tyranny than that which it replaced. Such is the nature of usurpation. A case in point is the rise to power of Islamists in the Arab spring – promising new regimes of tyranny which make the old regimes look pleasant by comparison.

On secessionist movements

In general, we should support these. The division of the usurpers on the whole will benefit the Cause. Division benefits the Cause in several ways:

  1. More separate usurpers, each individually weaker, are less likely to be able to harm the Cause, compared to fewer but individually more powerful usurpers
  2. With many usurpational powers, if one oppresses the Cause, others may at the same time leave it at peace – the oppressed servants of her Cause may flee from the place of oppression unto a place of liberty. With fewer but bigger usurpational powers, if one chooses to oppress the Cause, there are less opportunities to escape that oppression
  3. Great and undivided powers are more likely to be able to wage offensive war, etc. By dividing a great power into several smaller powers, we greatly reduce the potential for offensive war
So in general, we must recognise a right of secession – not an absolute right, but a right nonetheless. The right of secession is not absolute, but nor is it dependent upon the consent of the state seceded from. Such consent should be sought wherever possible; but its refusal, or the insistence upon unreasonable terms, cannot prevent the unilateral exercise of the right of secession. Secession should wherever possible be peaceful, but where the state being seceded from attempts to prevent the secession through force, it is permissible to respond in kind.

Exceptions to the general right of secession:
  1. where the group seceding are extremely small, or widely dispersed, and would not constitute a viable independent state. Groups in this position should focus on increasing their numbers, consolidating their numbers (by moving from a state of geographical dispersion to a state of geographical centralisation), and then secession may become viable in the future. Indeed, this is the very path the holy Cause is advised to take.
  2. while secession from an usurpational power, in most cases, increases liberty – in that, while it does not produce complete liberty from the usurpational powers, it weakens them, and thus increases our degree of liberty from usurpation – by contrast, secession from the assumed place reduces liberty, since it results in subjection to the usurpers which did not previously exist, thereby reducing our freedom from usurpation. Along with every other exercise of secession which reduces liberty, this exercise is an exception to the legitimate right of secession. It must be clear, this does not prohibit a province seceding from province, or diocese from diocese, while still remaining in the benefit of the assumed place; this prohibits any person who has received the benefit of the assumed place, of non-usurpational rule, from being deprived of that benefit.
  3. where secession is being manipulated by a greater usurpational power in order to increase its control. A good example is the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia – which were used by Russia in an attempt to dominate Georgia. We cannot compare these cases to Kosovo – support for Kosovo’s independence came, not from a single great usurpational power, but from an alliance of usurpational powers, both greater (US, UK, France, Germany) and lesser. Kosovo is not a case of a single regional power trying to dominate Serbia. The independence of Kosovo has been accepted by numerous countries around the world; only a handful other than Russia have recognized South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Russia’s position is absolutely absurd – independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but not for Kosovo, or Chechnya? Russia’s support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia is pure hypocritical opportunism, which we should see right through. This is not true secession – it is Russian expansionism, the very opposite of secession.
  4. where the movement seeking secession adopts aberrant ideologies, such as Islamism, or where secession is likely to result in such ideologies triumphing. Islamism is a grave threat to the Cause, because Islamists oppose the religious freedom of the Cause, they advocate crimes against love, and wicked murders and tortures – bloody sacrifices unto Pandal their false god.

Some specific cases in the contemporary world:

  1. We should strongly support Tibetan and Taiwanese independence. While the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy is not perfect, they are far better than the Chinese Communist Party.

  2. As mentioned, oppose the claims of the Russian puppet states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Transnistria also falls into this category.
  3. The independence of Kosovo should be supported. Demands for secession of Serbian parts of northern Kosovo could be met by territorial swaps between Kosovo and Serbia (e.g. northern Kosovo to Serbia, Presevo Valley to Kosovo)
  4. The case of the Nagorno-Karabakh, notwithstanding Russian support for Armenia, is more complex, and cannot be compared to South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transnistria
  5. An independent Kurdistan should be established
  6. The Turkish puppet state of North Cyprus’ demands for recognition should be ignored. Turkey, every the hypocrite, insists on independence for North Cyprus, yet will not accept the right of Kurds to secede from Turkey.
  7. The right of Catalonia and the Basque country to secede from Spain must be recognised
  8. Scottish independence should be supported
  9. If the people of Quebec wish to secede from Canada, we should give our support. At the same time, we might note that the presence of Quebec in Canada makes Canada a better place – it moderates some of the unpleasant tendencies of certain portions of the Anglophone population. So while if they vote for independence, we should support that, maybe this should not be overly encouraged.
  10. Likewise, the case of Puerto Rico – if Puerto Rico wishes to independent, it should be able to be. But statehood would be better for the United States – it would increase the number of “blue states”, and work against the negative influence of the “English-only” movement. So if Puerto Rico demands independence, we should support that; but we should encourage the people of Puerto Rico to seek statehood rather than independence.
  11. Palestine: Considering the particular historical circumstances of Palestine, the two state solution is no solution. The only solution viable in the long term is the one state solution – a state for all its citizens (not a “Jewish” state, neither an “Arab” state). However, the membership of Palestine in the UN, etc., should be supported, as a useful response to Israeli intransigence. And the preference for one rather than two states here, is an exception to the general principle of supporting secession, motivated by the specific historical circumstances of this situation.
  12. Northern Ireland: The status quo cannot be maintained. Ireland should be reunited. Is this a deviation from the right to secession – not really. It is not that Northern Ireland wanted to secede from Ireland, but that it did not want to secede from Britain. It is anti-secessionist, not secessionist, in nature, so secessionist principles would lead us to support Irish reunification. If Northern Ireland truly wished to be independent, of both the UK and the Republic, and if in doing so it was to give sufficient protection to minorities, then we should support that; but that is unlikely to happen. There are some other alternatives – such as a condominium between the UK and Ireland, or a co-principality, which while they have theoretical appeal, are also unlikely to ever happen. If the choice is between Unionism and Republicanism, we should support Republicanism.
  13. Jammu and Kashmir: We should oppose the Pakistani claims to Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike India, Pakistan is beset with totalitarian religious extremism – such as the Taliban, long supported as they have been by the Pakistani intelligence services. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are better off remaining as part of India. This is not a true secessionist movement anyway - if they were successful, the end result would not be a new independent state, but the transfer of territory from India to Pakistan. If other parts of India, for reasons other than Islamic extremism, wish to become independent, then we may support that, but not Jammu and Kashmir. The best solution to this conflict would be to formalise the status quo on the ground, with both India and Pakistan retaining the territory they currently control, agreeing to recognise the de facto border between them as de jure, and agreeing to refrain from supporting movements seeking to overturn that agreement.
On should observe from the above cases, that even when the right to secession exists, it is not always the best to use it. The best interests of the Cause must always be paramount.

On supernationalism/internationalism:

Is the EU a good thing or a bad thing? It is a form of usurpational power, and as such is inherently no better nor worse than the usurpational powers of which it is composed. It has no more and no less inherent legitimacy than they do.

Does the principle of supporting secession suggest we should oppose the EU? One might think that, but there are some reasons nonetheless to give the EU qualified support:

  1.  The EU provides us with certain liberties – important to the Cause – which without it might not exist, or might not exist to the same degree. Most important of these is the freedom of movement – the substantial freedom to freely move between member states. This freedom can be of great benefit to the holy Cause – for missionary ends, and also for the purposes of ingathering. (Even if the appointed place for the final ingathering is unlikely to be within the territory of the EU, lesser ingatherings can be a preparation for the final ingathering, and useful in themselves in strengthening the Cause.) Many opponents to the EU, base their opposition on opposition to these very freedoms. They are pro-usurpationalists, objecting to the EU because it takes away power from their preferred usurpational vehicle (the nation-state). But in general, their preferred usurpational vehicle is likely to be more tyrannical than the EU could ever be.
  2. The existence of the EU makes secession easier. The absence of trade barriers, a free market, a common currency, etc., greatly lowers the economic costs of secession. The EU has the historical potential to splinter the nation-state in Europe, and we must support that.
  3. The very inefficiency and complexity of the processes of EU decision making help reduce the potential for tyranny, and hence increase liberty. By contrast, the threat to liberty posed by the nation state is much more severe. The likelihood the EU will ever embark on US-style military adventures as the US is rather low – much lower than the risk that its individual member states will do. So what weakens the member states, while strengthening the EU, is likely to leave the world in a better place.
  4. The EU protects small states from larger states – some of the strongest opposition to the EU seems to come from the larger states (e.g. the UK – and in the UK’s case, in particular from Unionist quarters.) A pro-secessionist should then support rather than oppose the EU, since a pro-secessionist seeks to break up the larger states into many smaller states.
  5. We should strongly oppose certain manifestations of the EU – such as harmonisation of intellectual property laws, the European Arrest Warrant (which has already seen many abuses), the European Public Prosecutor and Eurojust (although one wonders if a European prosecutor might be more benign than national prosecutors – and whether the extension of the authority of the EU judiciary into these areas might likewise soften the heavy burden of false justice). But opposition to the EU itself is foolishness.
Of course, there is always the possibility that the EU could morph into something else entirely, and that we might live to regret adopting this position. But such a scenario is unlikely, the fears are overblown, and often they are drummed up by nation-statists.

Comment on the use of flags

In general, the religion of Maratreanism prohibits the display of flags of the usurpational powers, in such a way which might give the impression of showing support or allegiance for them. However, as an exception to the general rule, it is permitted to display a flag adopted by a secessionist movement in order to show support for that movement. Likewise the display of the Palestinian flag, the European flag, and the flag of Ireland is permissible to show support for the principles expressed in this document. (The display of the flag of Ireland is not permitted within the Republic of Ireland except in a context which makes clear that it is a show of support for Irish reunification, rather than a show of support for the Irish usurpational state.) This does not support the display of the Canadian flag in Quebec or the US flag in Puerto Rico. The principles outlined in this document are subject to change as the needs of the Cause direct.


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