PM5389: Dead Babies Prove the Existence of Parallel Universes

1.       There exists a loving God
2.       Souls exist, through which the human personality may survive death
3.       After people die, they go to heaven (whether immediately, or eventually), which is a perfect place of perfect happiness.
a.       We might suppose that some people (e.g. those who are good, or faithful, or whatnot) go to heaven immediately after death
b.      Whereas others may go there after some diversions, through purgatory, some further reincarnations, a (temporally limited) hell, etc.
An everlasting hell, or annihilation, is not compatible with premise (1), that there exists a loving God, for a truly loving God would not cause or permit such things.
1.       Suppose a baby dies shortly after birth. Let us suppose it is dearly loved and wanted by its parents, and they are greatly saddened by its death.
2.       Did the baby have a soul? Either the baby has a soul, or it did not has a soul. If the baby has a soul, the parents will be happy that it has a soul, and they have the possibility of a reunion with it in the afterlife. However, if it has no soul, then we may conclude no such possibility of reunion between baby and parents exists in the afterlife, to the grave detriment of the parents. Now, if the baby had no soul, and the parents cried out to the loving God “Please may it be that our dead baby has a soul, that we might be reunited with it in the afterlife” – a loving God would respond affirmatively to such a request. Thus we may conclude, that if the baby lacked a soul, the loving God would cause the baby to have a soul, in response to the earnest desire of the parents; therefore, the baby has a soul.
3.       If the baby dies, where does its soul go? We might suppose, to heaven. Then, when the parents die – maybe shortly thereafter, maybe many decades hence; maybe both together, or near in time to each other, maybe one far after the other – the dead baby and its parents are reunited in heaven. Now, when the dead baby and its parents are united in heaven, is the baby still a baby, or is it grown up?
4.       Let us suppose the baby is still a baby – will it remain a baby forever? Or will it grow up? Surely, while the parents would be thrilled to see their baby again, they would not want it to remain a baby – they would want the joy to watch it grow into adulthood. And a loving God would grant them that their wish – a wish so heartfelt and earnest, a wish so innocent, what loving God could not grant such a wish? Therefore, the baby must grow up – either in heaven, or prior to heaven.
5.       However, it is not possible for the baby to grow up in heaven. Growth implies meeting with challenges and obstacles, overcoming adversity, learning to deal with setbacks, traumas and grief. How are any of these things possible in heaven, a perfect place? Growth requires an environment of imperfection; so the baby cannot grow up in heaven. So if the baby must grow up, but the baby cannot grow up in heaven, this means the dead baby must grow up somewhere in between death and heaven.
6.       Furthermore, we might suppose that the parents want not only to watch their dead baby grow up – or if they cannot themselves watch it, at least become acquainted with the end product of that process – but also to see that their dead baby might, having grown up, one day also have the opportunity of having children of their own, if they so desire. This is likewise a perfectly innocent and good desire, that a loving God without doubt would grant. But, likewise it cannot occur in heaven – do people marry and have children in heaven? Since we have already concluded that babies cannot grow up in heaven, people could scarcely marry and have children there. We may also at this point quote the words of the Prophet Jesus, who expressed agreement with this notion: “For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels which are in heaven.” (Mark 12:25)
7.       Hence we must conclude that the dead baby must have the opportunity to grow to adulthood, and even parent children of its own, if it so desires, after its death, but before reaching heaven, where it is reunited with its parents.
8.       But if the baby is to do this, after death, but before heaven – where? We may distinguish three kinds of afterlives – those substantially better than this life, those substantially worse than this life, and those on par with this life. The first constitutes heavens and the second hells or purgatories. Now we have already concluded, that the baby cannot grow up in perfection, therefore it cannot grow up in any heaven. Even in a world not quite perfect, but still vastly better than this one, the baby would enjoy vastly reduced opportunities for growth. So the intermediate state (between death and heaven) in which the baby grows up, cannot be substantially better than this world, and so cannot be a heaven.
9.       But nor could the baby go to hell or purgatory. Firstly, the baby is innocent, so a loving God would not send the baby to any hell or purgatory. Secondly, just as we have concluded that some worlds are too good for growth, we must also conclude that some are too bad. A hell or purgatory might offer opportunities to growth, but only for someone who had certain prerequisites to make use of that growth opportunity. Let us suppose there is an afterlife which is a chillingly accurate simulation of Auschwitz, and the souls sent to this afterlife experience life as concentration camp inmates. The dead baby, sent there, would have either no opportunities for growth, or very limited opportunities for growth. However, for Adolf Hitler, that afterlife might represent substantial opportunities for personal growth – learning empathy with his victims. But since the dead baby lacks the prerequisite experience of being Adolf Hitler, the dead baby cannot benefit from such an afterlife in the ways in which Adolf Hitler might.
10.   So we have concluded that, in going to an intermediate state between death and heaven in order to grow up, that the dead baby cannot go to a world substantially better than this world (a heavenly realm), neither a world substantially worse than this world (a hellish or purgatorial realm); so, in conclusion the dead baby must go to an intermediate state of substantially the same nature as this world in which we now live.
11.   That leaves only two possibilities – either intermediate state to which the dead baby goes, is the very same universe in which we now live, in which the dead baby died; or else, the dead baby goes to a parallel universe, a different, separate universe, but of the same fundamental nature as this universe. Now clearly, the first option is only possible through reincarnation or rebirth – i.e. the baby must be born again, as another baby, in order for the baby to grow up in the same universe in which it died.
12.   Now we might suppose it would be reincarnated as a subsequent child of its parents. And, supposing that were the case, we might suppose the parents would be satisfied with this arrangement. However, such an arrangement would not always be possible – it will not always be the case, that having their baby die, the parents will go on to have another baby that the first baby could be reincarnated as. For all manner of reasons, it could well turn out that the baby who died was the last baby those parents had. So, while this might be a solution to our problem in some specific cases, it could not be a solution in all general cases.
13.   It might also be the case that the parents find dissatisfaction at this arrangement – the subsequent baby might be of a different gender to the dead one, a different appearance, a different temperament, and so forth. The parents would very likely have given it a different name. They will very likely think, that while they are pleased to have another baby, it is not the same as the baby they lost, and cannot in their mind be seen as replacing the baby that was lost. Given that this is not a general solution to the problem, and may not be a satisfactory solution even in those circumstances in which it is a possible solution, we must conclude, that if there is another way to solve our problem, a loving God would bring that other way about.
14.   The other way in which reincarnation might pose a solution, would be if the dead baby was reincarnated as someone else’s baby, who lived, and grew up as that baby. But would that satisfy the parents? They meet someone in heaven who grew up knowing someone else as their parents – “Oh, these people were your parents too, that incarnation when you died in infancy” – would not the person feel far closer to the parents they grew up under, than the parents of this brief and tragic incarnation. Would they even remember them? Even if they were by supernatural means granted a perfect recollection of this brief incarnation (such a gift is known as the spiritual gift of perfect memory), could they possibly feel the same depth of feeling for those parents as they would for those they grew up under? Surely both parent and child would feel that being deprived of the opportunity for the child to grow up with its parents was a tragic loss, and that while meeting again in heaven goes some way toward filling that loss, it falls vastly short of what the heart demands. So, if this is the best that anyone can do – even a loving God – it might have to do – but is there a better option?
15.   That leaves the final option to be considered – a parallel universe. Now there are two different types of parallel universes – unrelated ones and related ones. An unrelated universe would be a universe which has always been separate and distinct from this universe, even if it so happened to develop in similar directions. An unrelated universe might contain intelligent life, capable of civilization, culture, art, religion, science, technology, and everything we are – but that species (or those species) would not be ours, even if forces of convergent evolution made them similar to us. Whether one believes in evolution or intelligent design or something else entirely, one might suppose that two independent universes, with similar laws of physics, might well contain similar intelligent life-forms – it may well be, that something like the human body, is the optimum body type for developing an intelligent civilization, in any universe with similar laws of physics to ours, and thus even a totally unrelated universe, that happened to have similar laws of physics, if it also contained an intelligent civilization, it would contain bodies similar to ours (although undoubtedly, not exactly the same.) What about universes with radically different laws of physics – could such universe sustain intelligent life? If they could, would the life be similar to ours or radically different? I dare say, that is a question impossible to answer, and if it is a question impossible to answer, there is maybe not much point in our asking it.
16.   Now a related universe, in contrast, would be a universe which used to be the same universe as this universe, but where this universe and that universe have since ceased to be the same universe. In other words, we are talking about a division of universes, a branching timeline. Two related universes would be identical, and hence one and the same, up to the point of their division, and then thereafter they would be distinct – at first slightly, but one would expect, the differences to grow ever larger. A division of universes would be like one universe was copied, with a photocopier (a universe photocopier!), and modified slightly in the process – except, that while with a normal photocopier there is a clear distinction between copy and original, with the “universe photocopier” one would not be able to identify one universe as original and the other as not, but rather one must say they are both equally original.
17.   Whenever universes divide, we must suppose that all souls present in the universe at that time also divide; just as each successor universe is equally the original universe, so each successor soul is equally the successor soul. But souls that have already left the universe through death, or which have not yet entered it through birth, need not participate in that division.
18.   Now we might suppose the dead baby be reincarnated in an unrelated universe – but it is difficult to see how that solution would have any benefit over the baby being reincarnated in this one. If anything, it might be seen to be somewhat worse, since the grown up baby and its original parents would have little in common.
19.   Now among related universes, some are more closely related to our own than others. There may well be universes that diverged from ours thousands of years ago – there may be others which diverged from ours last week. A universe related to ours, but which diverged from ours long before our birth, is not much different to us than an entirely unrelated universe – in both cases, we have never nor shall ever exist in that other universe, unless we do so through such means as a branching sequence of reincarnations – in this incarnation, we certainly do not exist in such a universe. But in a closely related universe, which diverged say a few weeks ago, then we do exist in that universe as well as this one, in the very same life; albeit, in what has now become, different versions of ourselves, even as, a few weeks ago, these two versions were one and the same and absolutely identical to each other.
20.   Now one might suppose the dead baby be reincarnated in a closely related universe. If it was so reincarnated, would there be any benefit, compared to it being reincarnated in the same universe as this one? It would seem a closely related universe would be no more beneficial than the same one, and might be even less beneficial, although not by as much as rebirth in the unrelated universe or the distantly related universe would be.
21.   But a closely related universe, there is another option other than reincarnation – there could be a closely related universe, diverging from this one at or before the baby’s death, in which the baby does not die, but goes on to grow to adulthood.
22.   We mentioned earlier, that we should expect universe division to result in soul division. What then happens to the baby’s soul? There are two possible answers:
a.       while in the general case, universe division implies soul division, there is one circumstance in which a universe may divide without at least one of the souls therein dividing – where the universe division is associated with a person’s death. Generally speaking, we might say that at death the soul exits the universe (ignoring the possibility of intrauniversal reincarnation.) However, if the change which distinguishes the two universes is the death of a person – such that the first difference between them, is that in one universe the person dies, in the other they do not – then we might say, that rather than the soul exiting the universe at the point of division, that the soul goes to the universe in which life continues. Thus that soul would escape division, even though other souls would not. So the parents souls would divide, as would the souls of others, but not the soul of the baby.
b.      We might consider the case where the universes divide, not at the baby’s death, but some time before it. It may well be, that at the moment of the baby’s death, it is obviously beyond any hope of survival, and that therefore, the most feasible way of bringing about its continued life, is not to split the universe at the point of death, but at some time earlier, before the baby’s situation became so dire. But what then becomes of the baby’s soul in the universe-branch in which they die? We might suppose they exit the universe, unto heaven – but then, how does that division of the baby’s soul grow up? We are left with the same problem with respect to it as we have with respect to the baby’s soul in the non-universe division case – thus universe division buys us nothing.
c.       Another possibility is that the baby’s soul leaves it at the point of universe division, and that in the baby-dying universe, the baby is henceforth unensouled, soulless, up until the moment of its death. However, we might suppose this would be excessively cruel to the parents in the baby-dying universe, much as we supposed at the beginning that the dead baby never having had a soul at all.
d.      The third possibility is that the soul of the dead baby exits the baby-dying universe at death, but then instead of proceeding unto heaven, it instead enters the baby-living universe, and is merged back in to the soul of the baby-who-lives.
23.   If it is possible for souls to divide, surely it is possible for them also to merge? However, we must suppose that the merger of souls is a rather difficult and involved process. Here is one account of how souls might be merged. Let us suppose you and another earnestly and freely desire to merge your souls into one single soul, and that God has granted you the power to so merge. The process of merger would begin with telepathic powers – with the ability to read each other’s minds, thoughts, feelings, emotions, to see each other’s mental images. There would be a free, telepathic opening of each mind to the other. Let us suppose that these telepathic powers begin as weak – you have some awareness of what is in the mind of the other, but it is limited. But with time, by the free will of each party, they grow with respect to each other. Each gains access to the other’s memories as if they were their own. Each becomes perfectly and instantaneously acquainted with the contents of the other’s minds. One must suppose, that in such a circumstance, one would begin to lose the ability to tell whose mind was whose, and after some time, there would no longer be one mind and another mind, but rather one single mind – this is the merger of souls.
24.   Now, we must suppose that a loving God would not merge souls without the free consent of the souls to be merged – or at least, would not do so without some very good reason. A loving God would always prefer voluntary soul merger to involuntary soul merger. And a voluntary soul merger would be so much easier to attain than one in which the souls do not want to be merged, and are actively fighting against their merger.
25.   Could then the soul of the dead-baby be merged with the soul of the living-baby? One might suppose, no, since the souls would not be able to freely consent to their merger. However, while they could not freely consent, they could not in any way oppose it either. So this would be a non-voluntary soul merger as opposed to an involuntary soul merger. Furthermore, if had the necessary intellectual and emotional capacity to have an opinion on the issue, we would conclude that they would be highly likely to favour the merger. Firstly, they would care about the solution to the “how does dead baby grow up” problem as much as their parents do, and if soul merger helps to reach the optimal solution to that problem, they would be pleased to assist. Secondly, we must suppose that anyone (baby or adult), would be less opposed to soul merger with a different version of themselves, than they would be with a separate person; this must be especially so when that different version relatively recently divided from them (within hours or days or weeks), as opposed to if the division happened years or decades ago. Furthermore, we must remember that the richness of the content of an infant’s existence is less than that of an older child or adult – while their existence has great potential, the vast majority of that potential has not yet actualised. Thus, we may also conclude that an infant’s soul has far less content, far less complexity, than the soul of an older child or adult; and that, in a few hours or days or weeks, there would be less change in the soul of an infant, than there would in an adult or child in the same period. This suggests that merging the souls of infants should be easier than merging those of adults. So even though in general, we might suppose that the merger of souls is a rather difficult and involved task, in the case of the dead-baby merging with the living-baby, it is much simpler and more straightforward.
26.   My question then is – why might universe division produce a better solution to this problem than any of the other solutions discussed so far? At, or somewhat before, the moment of death of the baby, the universe divides into a living-baby universe and a dead-baby universe. Either the soul of the baby only continues in the living-baby universe, or else it later transfers from the dead-baby universe to the living-baby universe, and then merges back into the living-baby soul. The baby grows up to adulthood, with the very same parents it would have had it died in no universe, and enjoys the fullness that life has to offer. Eventually, baby dies, and so do the parents – both the living-baby version of the parents, and the dead-baby version of the parents. When the dead-baby parents get to heaven, they get to meet the baby, and their living-baby universe counterparts. Furthermore, God grants them perfect knowledge, insofar as they desire it, of the life of the baby in the living-baby universe. Finally, each of the dead-baby parent has the option – if the corresponding living-baby parent is agreeable – of merging their souls with their counterpart from the dead-baby universe.
27.   It is my belief, that of all the possible solutions, this is the most satisfactory. Why then would the loving God not do? If God is God, then surely God, having the power to create this universe, has the power to create others, whether unrelated or related – if God has the power to create universes, surely God has the power to divide them also. And if God is loving, and if this is the best solution to the earnest and deep and heartfelt and innocent desires of the baby and its parents, then why would a loving God not do it?
28.   Potuit Decuit Ergo Fecit – God could have done it, it would be fitting for God to have done it, therefore God must have done it.
29.   So, in conclusion, by the argument from dead babies, we can conclude that parallel universes must exist.